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ABSTRACT: In the dynamic model presented in the paper manufacturing
and service firms coexist. They use labor inputs provided by households
which buy both the manufactured good and the service. The latter may differ
in its quality depending on the effort level of the firms’ employees. Service
firms must invest in reputation for quality. As the long-term equilibrium
emerging in a competitive framework is characterized by unemployment, the
imposition of a binding wage floor lowers employment in the service sector
without affecting the employment level of the manufacturing sector: the
wage differentials between the two sectors shrink and the quality level of the
service improves, but unemployment increases. As the competitive solution
leads the economy to a full-employment steady state, a binding but relatively
low minimum wage may bring about a more equalitarian income
distribution and upgrade the quality content of  jobs in the service sector,
without creating unemployment.
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3INTRODUCTION
When the recent labor market performances of the US and continental
Europe are compared, the difference in the employment rate, i.e., the
proportion of the working-age population in employment, is even more
striking than the differential in the unemployment rate.1 What is more, the
employment gap between the US and the EU depends in its entirety on
service sector employment, since the proportion of the working-age
population employed in manufacturing is the same in the two areas.2 In the
early 1970s, when differences in labor and product markets regulations and
rigidities between the two sides of the Atlantic were just as marked as they
are now, and when the structural process which is expanding the
employment share of services at the expense of the manufacturing share was
still in its initial stages in continental Europe,3 labor markets performed
slightly better in Europe than they did in the US. Therefore, one may
plausibly conclude that institutions became relevant in differentiating labor
                                                          
1
 In 1997, the unemployment rate was 4.9 in the USA, 11.7 in Germany, 12.5 in France and
12.1 in Italy. In the same year, the employment rate was 73.5 in the USA, 63.5 in Germany,
58.8 in France and 50.5 in Italy.
2
 The share of the working-age population employed in manufacturing is 17.7 in the USA
and 17.8 in the EU, while the share employed in services is 54.5 in the USA and 39.7 in the
EU (see European Commission, 1999).
3
 On this process, see IMF (1997); Rowthorn and Ramaswamy (1999).
4market outcomes when services replaced manufacturing as the major source
of new jobs (see, Appelbaum and Schettak, 1994). On this view, the
regulations and rigidities which restrict competition in the product and labor
markets have hampered job creation in the services sector of continental
Europe.
This paper focuses on the effects of wage compression on the
sectoral distribution of employment and on aggregate employment. The
model presented may shed light on how wage floors affect the relative size
of the manufacturing and service sectors, the quality and price of services,
and the overall employment rate. It is evident, in fact, that institutions like
progressive taxation, centralized wage-setting, collective bargaining and
minimum wage legislation tend to compress wage differentials (see
Freeman, 1998; Blau and Kahn 1999), typically by bringing up the bottom
of wage distribution. Furthermore, there is little doubt that these institutions
are much more important in continental Europe than they are in the USA. In
contrast with a controversial issue like the impact of minimum wage laws on
aggregate employment,4 it is widely accepted that wage setting institutions
help explain the differences in factor allocation, output mix and relative
                                                          
4
 Especially in the light of the debate begun by Card and Krueger (1995).
5employment rates between continental Europe and the US. These
differences the fact that the low-skilled have a higher
employment/population ratio relative to the higher skilled in the US than
they do in Europe,5 or to the evidence showing that in European countries
with low dispersion of earnings (relatively to the US) wage compression has
shifted the industry distribution of employment away from industries with a
low mean wage (see Davis and Henrekson, 2000). It is known that low wage
workers are generally under-represented in manufacturing, and that sectors
like trade, restaurants, hotels and personal services are typically those in
which workers on or near the minimum wage are over-represented (see
Dolado et al., 1996). Together with the fact that minimum wages (set by
unions or by laws) are much more binding in Europe than in the US (see
Dolado et al., 1996), this may also explain why the price level of the
services sector is higher in Europe than in the US, although the latter have
higher per-capita income (see Haffner et al., 1999), and why the production
of certain services (meals, childcare and care for the elderly…) is more
internalized within the family in many European countries than it is in the
                                                          
5
 See Blau and Kahn (1996). Comparing Germany and the US, Freeman and Schettak
(2000) find that even adjusting for the fact that German less skilled workers tend to be more
skilled than American ones, the German distribution of wages is more compressed than the
6US. Indeed, the relative abundance of low skilled workers in certain labor-
intensive industries in the US yields a relatively large supply of low-quality
services at cheap prices. Hence, it is not surprising that in these sectors
productivity in the US is relatively low: a familiar trade-off between labor
compensation and quality emerges.6
In this context, it is more appropriate to think of labor contracts as
(explicitly or implicitly) multidimensional, so that a legally binding lower
bound for one aspect of the contract (a minimum wage) is accommodated by
adjustments to other aspects of the contract (see Leamer, 1999): wage
compression can induce employers to upgrade productivity and the quality
of jobs (see Davis, 1995). Unlike in manufacturing, where the equipment
and technology in use often dictate a standardized level of attention, effort
and skills for operating them, services based on a person-to-person
relationship may vary widely in quality depending on the level of attention,
care, effort and preparation of those who provide them. The nature of these
                                                                                                                                                   
American distribution, and disproportionately fewer low skill Germans than low skill
Americans are employed.
6
 Gordon (1995) cites anecdotal evidence from Europe – the absence of grocery baggers in
stores or bus-boys in restaurants – to support the hypothesis that labor market institutions
like binding minimum wages explain why there are more low-wage workers in the US, and
hence service sector productivity in the US is relatively low. About 20 per cent of the US
working population is employed in low-skill jobs compared with 13 per cent in the EU (see
European Commission, 1999).
7jobs is better captured by thinking of this market as offering “a set of wage-
effort contracts with higher daily wages offsetting the disutility of higher
effort” (Leamer, p.1128).
A proper modelling of the functioning of product markets in services
sector where quality is important and can vary depending on the workers’
effort requires account to be taken of the informational asymmetry typically
characterizing the relationship between the customer demanding the service
and the firm providing it. This is captured here by assuming that firms
operating in the services sector invest in enhancing their reputation for
quality, which like all other types of investment is sensitive to changes in the
discount rate.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the model.
Section 2 is devoted to deriving the optimizing behavior of agents. Section 3
characterizes the equilibrium paths of the economy. Section 4  compares the
steady states of this economy that emerge when wages are determined in a
purely competitive way against the steady states emerging in the presence of
a binding minimum wage. Section 5 contains a brief summary of the main
results of the paper and discusses a possible extension.
81 THE MODEL
Let us consider an economy in discrete time with a constant
population of identical individuals--whose large number is normalized to be
one--which consume both a manufactured good xt and a service which may
differ with respect to its quality qt. The manufactured good is homogeneous
and is produced by a large number of perfectly competitive firms. Similarly,
there is a large number of firms which provide the service, whose quality
depends on the effort and care of their employees.
The manufacturing firms
The large number of firms producing the homogeneous consumer
good xt is normalized to be one. They produce according to the technology
 1,0 ,Sx tt <<= ξξ (1)
where St are the workers employed in period t by the representative firm
producing the consumer good. Since production is standardized, it requires a
fixed level of effort et=ê by any single worker. In each t the representative
firm chooses its labor input in order to maximize its profit:
,wSS ttt
m
t −=
ξpi (2)
where wt is the real wage paid to the firm's employees. Note that xt is not
storable and is taken to be the numéraire of this economy.
9The service-producing firms
Also the large number of firms producing the consumer service is
normalized to be one. The units of the service that a firm provides in period
t, Nt, depend on the number of workers employed by the firm in that period,
Lt:
1.0 ,L=N tt << ζς (3)
The quality of the service provided by the firm in period t, qt, depends on
the effort level et of its employees in that period:
qt=et. (4)
Being the workers' effort perfectly observable, the representative firm makes
pay contingent on the observed effort level:
vt=v(et), (5)
where vt is the wage paid by the firm to its employees in period t if their
observed effort level in that period is et.
In each t an individual buys the service that s/he wishes to consume
from one single producer, which amounts to saying that in each period the
consumer selects a unique (perceived) quality level for the service that s/he
wishes to buy. Consumers cannot observe qt ex ante (before they have
purchased the service), and they know that the quality of the service may
10
vary across firms and time. On the other hand, they are informed ex post
about the quality of the service provided by each firm. In particular, the
perceived quality of the service supplied in period t by a firm, qte , is based
on its reputation, which depends on its past performances in terms of
quality:
given, q 1,0 ,)q-1(qq e01-te 1-tet <<+= χχχ (6)
where we assume for simplicity that χ =.5. Moreover, note that (6) entails
both 0.t q=q if q=qlim and q=q if q=q t
e
t
t
1-t
e
i-t
e
1-t
e
t >∀••
∞→
 In other
words, a firm's reputation and the consumers' estimates of the quality of its
service do not change if the quality level observed in the current period
confirms what the consumers expected; and this reputation  tends
asymptotically to be equal to the observed level of quality if the latter
remains constant forever, whatever the initial firm's reputation may be.
The price that a firm can charge for each unit of service depends on
its reputation for quality:
p = (q )t tep ,   (7)
where the "hedonic" function p( )qte  is given to any single firm.
Thus, the period profit function of a service-producing firm is:
ttt
e
t
s
t Lv)L(q −= ςpi p . (8)
In each period, a firm chooses its wage and labor policy in order to
maximize its value, i.e. its discounted sequence of profits:
11
1,0  ,max
0j
s
jt
j
L,v tt
<<∑∞
=
+ θpiθ (9)
subject to (3)-(8).
Individuals as consumers and workers
If yt is the total income of an individual in period t, we have:
,)Nq(xy tettt p+≥           (10)
where the hedonic function p( )qte  is given to any single consumer.
The period utility that an individual obtains by consuming the service
is separable between the units Nt and the quality qt of the service that s/he
buys:
1.0 1,0 ,q+N=)q,N( tttt <<<< βαβαg          (11)
Separability is assumed in (11) in order to simplify the analysis, in the light
of the fact that both opposite cases can be plausible: the case in which the
increment in utility obtainable by consuming an additional unit of the
service is larger when the quality of the service is relatively low (quantity
tends to substitute for quality), and the case in which consuming more units
has a larger impact on utility when the quality of the service is high (quantity
and quality tend to be complement).
The household’s total income is given by
,dhy ttt +=           (12)
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where ht is the household’s labor income and dt is the household’s share of
the  firms’ total profits in period t. The household’s labor income is given
by:



=
firm. producing-servicea  in eeffort   with worksindividual  theif )e(=v
(13)                             firm ingmanufactura  in  worksindividual  theif  w
employednot  is individual  theif     0
h
ttt
tt
v
For simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume that all households
receive an equal share of the firms’ profits:
s
t
m
ttd pipi += .           (14)
An individual has a period utility function that is quasi-linear:
)q,g(N+)ef(xu ttttt −=           (15)
where f(et), which captures the disutility of being employed in a firm instead
of staying at home, gives the minimum wage for which an individual is
willing to work at an effort level et:



≥>=
.firm producing-servicea  in teeffort    with worksindividual  theif te
1 0, ),eˆ=t(e firm ingmanufactura  in  worksindividual  theif eˆ
(16)                                        0)=t(e employednot  is individual  theif  0
)f(et
γη
γηγη
The problem that the an individual has to solve in each t is the
following:
,umax t
e,N,q ttt
          (17)
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subject to the information asymmetry implying that a firm's reputation for
quality qte  signals the "true" level of quality embodied in the service offered
by that firm, and subject to the period budget constraint (10).
The utility function implies implicitely that the service satisfies a
basic need. Even if some household is unemployed in t, s/he receives a share
of the firms’ profits (thanks to his/her property rights or to a redistributive
policy), which allows him/her to devote any additional income to increasing
his/her consumption of xt: for all households and in all periods, the demand
for the service is independent of the level of income and the consumption of
xt is strictly positive.
It follows straightforwardly from (10)-(17) that the necessary
conditions for inducing an individual to work in a manufacturing firm or in a
service-producing firm with an effort level et  are, respectively,
wt- 0eˆ ≥
γη ,         (18a)
and
,0e-)e( tt ≥γηv         (18b)
where the optimal effort level of the worker depends on the incentive wage
scheme of the firm.
Legislation or  union activity establishes a wage level below which
no firm is allowed to pay its employees. Thus,
γηeˆm0 t, ,wm t <<∀≤ ,         (19a)
and
14
m t, ,v t ∀≤         (19b)
where m is the minimum wage that is legally enforced. Considering (18a)
and (19a), one sees that m is never binding in the manufacturing sector,
since it is assumed to be lower than the level below which no worker is
willing to work in a manifacturing firm. The sole purpose of this assumption
is to focus the analysis on the cases that are probably more relevant from an
empirical viewpoint, since it is primarily as regards as some low-quality jobs
of the service sector that market forces tend to push pay below the legally
binding minimum wage.
Market equilibrium conditions
Assuming perfect labor mobility between the manufacturing and the
service segments of the labor market, equilibrium in the labor market
requires
γγ ηη ttt e-)e(eˆ-w v= .          (20)
If  wt-
γηeˆ = γη tt e-v >0, each household strictly prefers working rather than
remaining at home, and the equilibrium is necessarily characterized by full
employment. Indeed, if there are unemployed workers, they exert downward
pressure on the wages in both labor markets, and they raise the effort that the
workers are willing to make in the service sector for any given pay level, up
to the point at which γγ ηη ttt e-veˆ-w = =0. Therefore, the presence of
unemployment implies that at equilibrium  γγ ηη ttt e-)e(eˆ-w v= =0: an
unemployment equilibrium (S + Lt t <1) is a situation in which the optimizing
15
firms do not create enough jobs to employ the entire workforce even if the
employed workers do not receive any rent. Note that, in the presence of full
employment, a marginal improvement of working conditions in the
manufacturing sector (lower eˆ ) tends to exert upward pressure on the
monetary compensation necessary to induce the workers of the service
sector to work at any given level of effort.
At equilibrium, supply and demand of the manufactured good must
be equal:
d
t
s
t x=x .           (21)
The equilibrium price of the service p qt te= p( )  must be such that at
that price both the units of the service supplied are equal to the units
demanded and the reputation for quality of the service-producing firms is
equal to the quality level demanded by the representative consumer:
,N=N dt
s
t           (22)
and
d
t
e
t qq = .           (23)
2 THE OPTIMIZING BEHAVIOR OF THE AGENTS
Households
Maximizing (17), we obtain the conditions that the consumers'
demand for the service must satisfy for optimality:
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(24b)                                                                                 ,qN)q('
and
(24a)                                                                                       N=)(q
1-
tt
e
t
1-
t
e
t
β
α
β
α
=p
p
and the condition that the effort level of a household must satisfy if s/he
works in a service-producing firm:
1-
tt e=)e(' γγηv .         (24c)
It is evident that the rule applied by an optimizing household to decide
whether to work and--possibly--in what type of firm to work produces the
conditions (18) and (20).
Equation (24a) states that for optimality the price charged for one
additional unit of the service characterized by the (perceived) quality level
desired by the consumer must be equal to the marginal increase in utility
obtainable with this additional consumption. Equation (24b) establishes
that--along an optimal path--the increment in expenditure that a consumer is
willing to undertake for a marginal improvement in the (perceived) quality
of the units of the service that s/he intends to buy must be equal to the
additional utility brough about by this improvement. Finally, equation (24c)
states that the optimal level of effort of a worker employed in a service-
producing firm must be such that a marginal increment in the effort level
causes an increase in disutility equal to the increase in pay that the worker is
able to receive thanks to this additional effort.
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Manufacturing firms
For optimality, the manufacturing firms equalize the value of the
marginal productivity of labor to the market wage:
ξ ξS wt -1 t= .         (25a)
From this condition one can easily obtain the optimal demand for
labor of the manufacturing firms:
S w
w
t t
t
= =
−S ( ) .( ) ( )ξ ξ1 1         (25b)
Service-producing firms
Maximizing the Hamiltonian
H= θt
t=0
∞
∑ [ ]





+


 +
+ m-)(e2
)q(e
-q-)Le(-)Lq( tt
e
tte
1ttttt
e
t vvp ρλζ  with
respect to Lt, et and qt+1e , and eliminating the multiplier tλ , we obtain the
following conditions that an optimal path must satisfy:
ζ ζp v(q )L (e ),te t-1 t=         (26a)
2
)e(')-L()q('L
=)e(')-(L +1t1t+1t
e
+1t+1t
ttt
vp
v +
+ ρθθρ
ζ
,         (26b)
where 0 entails m)(et => tv ρ .
An optimal path must also satisfy equation (6) and the transversality
condition
lim L e )q
t
t
t t t
e
→∞
=θ 2 0v ' ( .         (26c)
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Finally, the optimal wage scheme (the optimal labor contract) of the
service-producing firm must satisfy (20), taking into account that optimal
workers’ behavior entails (18b) and (24c).
Condition (26a) equalizes the value of the marginal productivity of
labor at the optimal effort level to the wage that must be paid to generate
that level of effort. Condition (26b) captures the intertemporal trade-off that
the firm has to face, while (26c) states that along an optimal path the current
value of the firm must converge to a finite quantity.
According to (26b) and (26c), along an optimal path which is not
affected by the existence of the statutory minimum wage m)(e( t >v
entailing 0t =ρ ),  the additional labor cost incurred in the current period by
the firm in order marginally to improve the quality of all the units produced
must be equal to the discounted increment in future revenues due to the
higher prices that it will be able to charge on all the units of its service
thanks to its improved reputation. In other words, its reputation for quality
can be considered to be the only asset owned by a firm, and along an optimal
path the current value of this asset must be equal to the discounted sequence
of additional revenues that the firm can get by a marginal improvement of its
reputation.
In contrast, along an optimal path which is affected by the existence
of the statutory minimum wage, tv ρ and m)(et =  can be different from zero
19
to capture the forced deviation of the wage policy from the strategy that
would be optimal in the absence of a tight constraint.
3 THE EQUILIBRIUM PATHS
Manufacturing sector
The presence of unemployment in period t implies that the wage at
which the manufacturing firms would employ all the workers who do not
work in a service-producing firm is strictly below the minimum wage at
which a worker is willing to work in a manifacturing firm: even at γηeˆ=wt
some worker remains unemployed. Thus, in the presence of unemployment,
the employment level of the manufacturing sector must be such that
 <


=
− )1(1
t
w
S=S
ξξ
1 Lt− ,           (27)
where we have used the optimal labor demand (25b), and where
γηeˆw=wt = .           (28)
The presence of full employment in period t implies that the wage at which
the manufacturing firms are induced to employ all the workers who do not
work in a service-producing firm is larger than or equal to the minimum
wage at which a worker is willing to work in a manifacturing firm. Thus,
 
)1(1
t
t
w
=S
ξξ −




= tL1 − ,           (29)
from which we obtain that
≥== ξξ -1ttt )L-1()w(Lw γηeˆ .           (30)
20
Note that the wage that clears the labor market of the manufacturing sector
in a full-employment equilibrium increases with the employment level of the
service sector. Indeed, the labor supply of the manufacturing sector shrinks
as more people are employed in the service sector, thus exerting an upward
pressure on wt.
The dynamics as the existence of m does not affect the equilibrium path
(competitive solution)
As the minimum wage is never binding, equations (4), (6), (20), (24),
(26), (28) and (30) can be used to obtain the system of difference equations
in ett q and L  governing the equilibrium path of the economy:
(31a) ,0
2
))L((L
2
)q())L((L=)q,L,L(
1-
1t1+t
1-e
1+t1-
tt
e
1+t1+tt =−−Φ +
γβ
γ θγηθβγη ff
( ) 0,=
2
)L(qq=)q,q,(L t
e
te
+1t
e
t
e
+1tt
f+
−Ψ           (31b)
where













+
−
=
 (31c)                    nt        unemployme is  thereif 
1)v(L
employment full is  thereif  
1
eˆ
)w(L)v(L
=e)L(
t
tt
tt
γ
η
γ
η
γ
f
and
1-
ttt L=v=)v(L αζαζ .         (31d)
Apparent in (31) is the negative relationship linking the employment
level of the service sector and the effort level of the workers (and thus, the
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quality level of the service) along an equilibrium path. Moreover, no link
exists between the manufacturing sector and the service sector in the
presence of unemployment. In contrast, in the presence of full employment,
both the effort level and the wage rate prevailing in the service sector
depend on the conditions of the labor market in the manufacturing sector,
which in their turn are affected by Lt: since 
γγξ ηηξ t1-tt eeˆ)L-(1-v =+ ,
the optimal wage scheme must offer higher pay for any effort level as
employment in the service sector increases. A similar effect is produced by a
reduction of the (standardized) disutility of working in a manifacturing firm
(lower eˆ ): in the presence of full employment, an improvement in the
working conditions in the manufacturing sector tends to increase the
monetary compensation that is necessary to induce the workers of the
service sector to provide a given level of effort.
The dynamics as the existence of m affects the equilibrium path
If m is binding, one has:
)-1(1
m
=L(m)LLt
αζαζ 


==
        (32a)
and
2
)m(qq
e
te
1+t
r+
= ,         (32b)
where
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












+
−
==
 (32c)                    nt        unemployme is  thereif 
1
m
employment full is  thereif  
1
eˆ
)w(L(m)m
=eem)( t
γ
η
γ
η
γ
r
and
vt=v=m.         (32d)
It is not surprising that in (32a) an increase in m lowers the employment
level of the service sector. However, if m<m", where
)eˆ,,,,,("m" ζξηγαm=  is the maximum value of m that is consistent with a
full-employment equilibrium,7 a marginal increment in m leads to a fall in
wt and to an increase in the employment level of the manufacturing sector,
which leaves aggregate employment unchanged at its full-employment
equilibrium. If this is not the case (m>m"), a higher m shrinks the employed
workforce, since the manufacturing sector cannot absorb the workers left
unemployed by the service sector.
Moreover, it is worth noting in (32c) that a larger m leads to a higher
effort level and improves the quality of the service produced by the firms.
Indeed, in an equilibrium with unemployment, the pressure exerted by the
                                                          
7
 In other words, m" is that value of m satisfying
1)-1(
1
m
)-1(1
eˆ
LS =

+



=+
αζαζξ
η
ξ
γ .
23
unemployed workers induces the households to accept a wage scheme
linking m to that effort level which makes an individual indifferent as to
working or staying at home. Therefore, corresponding to a larger m is a
higher e. In a full-employment equilibrium, the positive effect of a larger m
on the effort level is magnified by the fact that the equilibrium w tends to
decline, thus making it less convenient to work in a manifacturing firm and
inducing the workers to accept worst working conditions in the service
sector for a marginally larger m.
4 STEADY-STATE ANALYSIS
The steady states as the existence of m does not affect the equilibrium path
By setting et
e
+1t
e
t+1t q=q=q and L=L=L , one can solve (31) for
the steady states of this economy as the statutory minimum wage does not
influence the equilibrium path (competitive solution).
 In a steady state characterized by unemployment we have:
0  ,0  ),,,,,(eqq e <<=== ηθζγβηθ eee 8         (33a)
(the bar "   " denotes the value of a variable evaluated at a steady state in
which there is unemployment and m is not binding),
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βαζαγζαζ
αζ θβ
θγ
η
αζηθ
)-(1+
1
-1
)-(2
,.),(











=e .
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)-1(1
e
=L
αζ
η
αζ
γ 



,         (33b)
γηev =         (33c)
and (27)-(28). This steady state characterized by unemployment exists if and
only if mv >  and mineˆeˆ > , where ),,,,,,(eˆmin ζξηγθβαe=  is that value
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 (if mineˆeˆ = , there
is full employment). In other words, in an economy in which the statutory
minimum wage has no effect on the equilibrium path, the existence of
structural unemployment (i.e., the existence of a steady state with
unemployment) is due to the fact that it not profitable for the service-
producing firms to absorb all the workers left unemployed by the
manufacturing firms. Indeed, the wage required by the households to work
in a manufacturing firm is too high (relatively to the values of the other
structural parameters of the economy) to be consistent with full
employment.
It is easy to check that 0>θe : one can see in (33) that, as the agents
discount the future less heavily because of a lower interest rate ( ↑θ ), the
steady-state level of the effort (and the steady-state level of the quality of the
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service) decreases, thus increasing the steady-state level of employment. A
lower discount rate raises the threshold which the wage paid in the
manufacturing sector cannot exceed without creating structural
unemployment. In fact, as the future increments in firms' profits resulting
from an additional investment in quality are discounted less heavily, firms
tend to invest up to a point at which the marginal cost of their investment is
higher. This is achieved by enlarging the workforce to which a current
marginal increase in pay can apply. This effect dominates the reduction in
the marginal cost of a quality improvement due to the lower level of quality
at which the firms operate. As a result, a larger θ  brings about a larger
steady-state level of employment and activity in the service sector (number
of units produced), associated with a lower quality and effort level and with
a lower price of the service. As the same effort level is associated with
more disutility )( ↑η , 0<ηe : we have in (33) that both the steady-state
level of employment and the effort level in the service sector decline.
Considering (27)-(28), it is apparent that a larger η  has a depressive impact
on total steady-state employment also because it raises the minimum wage
below  which no worker is willing to work in a manifacturing firm (note that
a similar effect on S is caused by an increase in ê).
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One can check that the system obtained by linearizing (31) around its
steady state (33) exhibits saddle-path stability:9 the linearized system
characterizes a unique path converging to the steady state with
unemployment.10
If the statutory minimum wage is not binding and ê<êmin, a steady
state characterized by unemployment cannot exist because the wage required
by the households to work in a manifacturing firm is low enough (relatively
to the values of the other structural parameters of the economy) to eliminate
unemployment. In this case, there exists a full-employment steady state,
which must satisfy the following system:
q ( ) = ee = =q e L ,         (34a)
eˆ=L)(n ,         (34b)
                                                          
9
 The characteristic equation of the linearized system is the following:
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λ , where 21  and λλ , which are the
characteristic roots, are such that 11 >λ  and 10 2 << λ . For instance, let .8=ζ ,
,5.== βα ,1== ηγ   and .9=θ : one has .5366,L .581,e ==  9768.11 =λ
and  .562.2 =λ
10
 If  mineˆeˆ > , which is a necessary condition for the existence of a steady state with
unemployment, also a full-employment steady state exists: the existence of the steady state
with unemployment characterized by (33) entails the existence of a full-employment steady
state which is locally unstable (see the appendix). Since the economy tends to move away
from this full-employment steady state existing when mineˆeˆ > , we can ignore it.
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1-L=v=v(L) αζαζ >m         (34c)
and
S=1-L,         (34d)
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1-L)-(1=w=w(L) ξξ .
If ê<êmin, one can show that under general conditions the system
obtained by linearizing (31) around )v~,L~,e~,q~,q~( e ("  "~ denotes the value of
a variable evaluated at the full-employment steady state characterized by
(34)) is saddle-path stable (see the appendix).
The steady states as the existence of m affects the equilibrium path
If the statutory minimum wage m is binding (m> v ), an economy
structurally similar to the economy whose steady state exhibits
unemployment, i.e., an economy having values of α β γ η θ ξ ζ,  ,  ,  ,  ,   ,  and
ê consistent (in the absence of institutional constraints) with the existence of
(33), converges to a steady state characterized by
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,           (35)
(27)-(28), (32a ) and (32d) ("*" denotes the value of a variable evaluated at a
steady state in which there is unemployment and m is binding). Inspection of
equation (32b), immediately shows that (32) is dynamically stable.
Similarly, if the statutory minimum wage m is such that m"mv~ ≤< ,
an economy structurally similar to the economy with a (full-employment)
steady state satisfying (34) converges monotonically to the full-employment
steady state characterized by
γγ
η
1
e eˆ
w(L(m))-m
e=q=q 


+=°°° ,         (36a)
S = 1- L(m)° ,         (36b)
(32a) and (32d) ("°" denotes the value of a variable evaluated at a full
employment steady state in which m is binding).
If the statutory minimum wage is strictly larger than m”, an economy
structurally similar to the economy characterized by the full-employment
steady state (34) converges monotonically to the steady state with
unemployment given by (35).
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Comparison between the steady-state levels of employment, pay and quality
Let us take an economy whose steady state is given by (33): the
structural characteristics of this economy (its parameters' values) are such
that its long-term equilibrium exhibits unemployement even if the statutory
minimum wage is relatively low and is not binding. Suppose now that--other
things remaining equal--m is increased up to a point where m> v , the
intention being to reduce wage dispersion. The end result will be an increase
in aggregate unemployment due to a fall in the employment level of the
service sector that does not affect the number of workers  employed in the
manufacturing sector: L* < L  and S* = S . However, the wage differential
between the two sectors shrinks and the quality level of the service
improves: w - v > w * -v *11 and e = q < e* = q *, where w = w * and
v*=m. In other words, in the service sector we end up with fewer and better
paid jobs of higher quality.
Let us now take an economy in the full-employment steady state
characterized by (34) (m is not binding). If m is increased up to a point
where
                                                          
11
 Typically, we can have an increase of the average wage of the employed workers.
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v~ <m<m”, full employment is preserved, but with a different employment
composition, since L < L° ~  and S > S° ~ . The increased share of the
manufacturing sector on total employment is accompanied by a reduction in
the wage differential between the two sectors ( ~w > w°  and ~v < v° , where
v°=m) and by an improvement in the quality content of the jobs in the
service sector ( ~ ~e = q < e = q° ° ). However, if m is increased up to a point
where m>m”, the manufacturing sector cannot entirely compensate the job
losses occurring in the service sector and unemployment is created: L* < L~
and S* < S~ , where L*+S*<1. Again, an upgrading of the service quality
occurs (e = q < e* = q*)~ ~ .
5 CONCLUSIONS
We have compared the long-term equilibria emerging in a purely
competitive framework to the steady states emerging when a minimum wage
is binding in the service sector.
As the competitive solution is associated with the presence of
structural unemployment, the imposition of of a binding minimum wage
raises aggregate unemployment by lowering the employment level of the
service sector without affecting the employment level of the manufacturing
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sector. In this case, the wage differential between the two sectors shrinks
and the quality level of the service improves.
As the competitive solution leads the economy to a full-employment
steady state, both a minimum wage that is binding but relatively low can be
imposed and full employment can be preserved. In this case, the share of the
manufacturing sector on total employment increases while the service sector
shrinks. Moreover, the wage differential between the two sectors is reduced
and the quality of the service improves. In other words, a more egalitarian
income distribution and an upgrading of the quality content of the jobs in the
service sector are obtained at no cost in terms of increased unemployment.
However, if the minimum wage becomes too high, unemployment tends to
emerge since the manufacturing sector does not absorb all the workers who
cannot find jobs in the service sector.
An interesting extension of the model presented here is to allow for
capital accumulation and differences in productivity growth between the two
sectors, with the service sector lagging behind in terms of productivity
advances.
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APPENDIX
1  Proof that the existence of a steady state with unemployment entails the
existence of a full-employment steady state that is locally unstable
In order to verify that the existence of a steady state with unemployment
implies necessarily the existence of a full-employmnent steady state as the
economy is governed by (31), consider that: i) the steady-state value of the
workforce  employed in the service sector  given by (33b), L , is that value of L
satisfying v(L)=(e(L))γη ; ii) v(L)-(e(L))γη >0 for L< L  and
v(L)-(e(L))γη <0 for L> L ; iii) a steady state with unemployment exists if and
only if minmin eˆ   where,eˆeˆ >  is that value of eˆ)L( that  such eˆ =n , and  iv) the
function n(L) is continuous in L for LL ≥  and is such that ∞→
→
L)(lim
1L
n .
Together with the participation condition (18b), i) and ii) imply that in a
full-employment steady state the employment level of the service sector, L~ , must
be such that LL~ ≥ , while iii) and iv) imply that for any finite value of mineˆeˆ >
there exists a value L<1 satisfying (34). Therefore, we can conclude considering
iii) that, if there is a steady state with unemployment, then there exists also L~
satisfying (34) such that .LL~ >
The characteristic equation of the system obtained by linearizing (31)
around the (full-employment) steady state satisfying (34) is the following:
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where 21  and λλ  are the characteristic roots. Moreover, since
0
L
L)(
2
2
>
d
nd
 for LL ≥ ,           (A2)
we have necessarily that
mineˆeˆ if  0L~LL
L)(
>>
=d
dn
.           (A3)
One can check that (A3) entails 
L~)-(
e~
L~LL
L)(
- βγ>=d
df
, which in its turn
implies that both characteristic roots solving (A1) are greater than unity in absolute
value. For instance, let βα = =.5, ξ =.25, ê=.62002, .9=θ  and
.8  ,1 === ζηγ : one has  ,7926.L~ ,266.e~ ==  1λ =b+ic and 2λ =b-ic, where
b=.03674, c=1.0534 and i= -1 . The system is unstable since
b c2 2+ = >−θ 1 1.
2  Conditions insuring that the system obtained by linearizing (31) around a full-
employment steady state is saddle-path stable
If mineˆeˆ < , the necessary condition for the existence of a full-employment
steady state is that
0
LLL
L)(
<
=d
dn
.           (A4)
Together with (A3) and given the fact that ∞→
→
L)(lim
1L
n , (A4) implies the
existence of a value of L, call it L’, such that L’<1 and 0L'LL
L)(
=
=d
dn (the
function n(L) has a minimum at L=L’). In its turn, this implies that there exists a
value of eˆ , call it 'eˆ , such that eˆ'eˆ <  and 'eˆ=)(L'n . Given the continuity of
n(L), for any eˆ  such that mineˆeˆ'eˆ <<  there exists L
~
 satisfying (34b) and
L'L~L << : the system obtained by linearizing (31) around this steady state is
saddle-path stable. Indeed, we have
L'L~L  ,0
L~LL
L)(
<<<
=d
dn
.           (A5)
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One can check that (A5) entails 
L~)-(
e~
L~LL
L)(
- βγ<=d
df
, which in
its turn implies that the characteristic roots solving (A1) are such that 1λ >1
and 0< 2λ <1. For instance, let ξβα == =.5, ê=.72328, .9=θ  and
.8  ,1 === ζηγ : one has ,55516.L~ ,543.e~ == 1λ =1.5498 and 2λ =.7169.
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